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INTRODUCTION
On January 1, 2020, a sweeping set of new consumer protections
took effect in California.1 The California Consumer Privacy Act
(CCPA) breaks new ground in empowering consumers with the tools
necessary to protect their data privacy.2 Modeled partially after the
European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR),3
CCPA has been criticized for not going far enough,4 while affected
industries (including search engine and social media companies)
have generally regarded the bill’s enactment as the end times.5
CCPA enjoys strong support among Californians, with 88 percent in
favor of the legislation.6 However, one group of affected consumers
has been altogether reticent on the matter—the dead.
Though the deceased are unable to register opinions of any vari-
ety following their demise, it is foundational to many aspects of the
law that the dead’s wishes and rights be observed. Consider, for ex-
ample, the area of trusts and estates, in which individuals may ex-
press their wishes for the settlement of their property in the event
of their death, or the numerous dignitary statutes that criminalize
desecration of human remains.7 This Note argues that data privacy
rights should be included in the privacy, property, and dignitary
interests that the law extends posthumously.
1. See Jeff John Roberts, Here Comes America’s First Privacy Law: What the CCPA




3. See Tony Howlett, How GDPR, CCPA Impact Healthcare Compliance, COMPLIANCE
WK. (Aug. 12, 2019, 3:46 PM), https://www.complianceweek.com/data-privacy/how-gdpr-ccpa-
impact-healthcare-compliance/27558.article [https://perma.cc/Z2TX-8UUK].
4. See, e.g., Jazmine Ulloa, California Has Become a Battleground for the Protection of




6. Odia Kagan, Poll Shows Strong Public Support in California for CCPA, Even
Stronger Privacy Laws, JD SUPRA (Oct. 22, 2019), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/poll-
shows-strong-public-support-in-24081/ [https://perma.cc/F79Q-VLSG].
7. See generally Kirsten Rabe Smolensky, Rights of the Dead, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 763,
763-66 (2009) (discussing how the legal rules affecting the dead often stem from cultural
norms).
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First, a brief overview of what is meant by data privacy rights will
help clarify the following analysis. Data privacy laws (both do-
mestically and abroad) “govern[ ] the collection, use, processing,
preservation, and divulgence of personal information.”8 In statutes,
personal information often means “information that identifies an
individual, including an individual’s photograph, social security
number, driver identification number, name, address (but not the
5-digit zip code), telephone number, and medical or disability in-
formation.”9 The private sector has defined personal information
as including
(1) name, address, email address, phone number, (2) race,
nationality, ethnicity, origin, color, religious or political beliefs
or associations, (3) age, sex, sexual orientation, marital status,
family status, (4) identifying number, code, symbol, (5) finger
prints, blood type, inherited characteristics, (6) health care
history including information on physical/mental disability, (7)
educational, financial, criminal, employment history, (8) others’
opinion about the individual, and (9) personal views except those
about other individuals.10
However, data privacy is not limited to just the information
covered in statutes like the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act11 and the
Video Privacy Protection Act.12 As enumerated in CCPA, personal
information includes the myriad data that businesses collect on in-
dividuals: “where a consumer lives and how many children a con-
sumer has, how fast a consumer drives, a consumer’s personality,
sleep habits, biometric and health information, financial informa-
tion, precise geolocation information, and social networks.”13 This
kind of deeply personal information fuels artificial intelligence
recommendations for prospective dates and new varieties of dog
8. Samantha Cutler, The Face-Off Between Data Privacy and Discovery: Why U.S. Courts
Should Respect EU Data Privacy Law when Considering the Production of Protected
Information, 59 B.C. L. REV. 1513, 1514 (2018).
9. 18 U.S.C. § 2725(3).
10. Personal Information, BUSINESSDICTIONARY, http://www.businessdictionary.com/def
inition/personal-information.html [https://perma.cc/ZS6U-CRKT].
11. 18 U.S.C. § 2721.
12. Id. § 2701.
13. California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, ch. 55, § 2(e), 2018 Cal. Stat. 1807, 1809.
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food, reminders of upcoming birthdays and anniversaries, and
predictions on optimal fertility windows.14 The amount and scope
of information businesses collect about individuals rivals (and like-
ly exceeds) what even our closest friends, family, and romantic
partners know about us.15
Identifying the right to privacy as an “‘inalienable’ right[ ] of all
people,”16 California leads the way in protecting the kinds of in-
formation that many among us would consider deeply personal. This
is the kind of information that some would prefer was never
revealed—even after death.17 Generally, American culture has
understood this desire and has created legal protections to honor
this posthumous wish when it has been expressed. For example,
many public figures place their private papers under seal for a
certain number of years following their death18 or require the
destruction of their personal papers.19
Before American society transformed into an increasingly digital
culture, honoring a decedent’s intent with respect to personal papers
and information was fairly straightforward and typically entailed
taking possession of the physical papers, mail, and documents found
at the decedent’s residence and office, following the decedent’s
wishes.20 Today, most of one’s “papers” live electronically in cloud
storage, email accounts, and various social media profiles.21 The law
remains unsettled on how to regard an individual’s digital effects,
as courts determine whether these digital assets are more like
14. See Jonathan Zittrain, How to Exercise the Power You Didn’t Ask For, HARV. BLOGS
(Oct. 29, 2018), https://blogs.harvard.edu/jzwrites/2018/10/29/how-to-exercise-the-power-you-
didnt-ask-for/ [https://perma.cc/TPA6-7F66].
15. See Tim Herrera, How to See What the Internet Knows About You (and How to Stop
It), N.Y.TIMES (July 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/03/smarter-living/how-to-see-
what-the-internet-knows-about-you.html [https://perma.cc/FNU5-NXJX].
16. California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 § 2(a) (quoting CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 1).
17. See Sara S. Hodson, In Secret Kept, in Silence Sealed: Privacy in the Papers of Authors
and Celebrities, 67 AM. ARCHIVIST 194, 195 (2004).
18. See id. at 196.
19. Consider, for example, Franz Kafka, whose will instructed his executor to destroy all
his unpublished work (including The Metamorphosis). See Elif Batuman, Kafka’s Last Trial,
N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Sept. 26, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/26/magazine/26kafka-
t.html [https://perma.cc/8R4B-EVV8]. Ultimately (and ironically), the executor ignored
Kafka’s instructions and published several of his works. See id.
20. See Ajemian v. Yahoo!, Inc., 84 N.E.3d 766, 773-79 (Mass. 2017).
21. See Natalie M. Banta, Death and Privacy in the Digital Age, 94 N.C. L. REV. 927,
927 (2016).
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property or are something else altogether.22 However, a vast trove
of personal data currently exists beyond the control of any individ-
ual: the personal information created about an individual but not
created by that individual. This is the very information CCPA was
designed to protect,23 but the law’s scope contains a significant gap.
While CCPA empowers individuals to control this personal data in
their lifetime,24 CCPA stops short of empowering the personal rep-
resentatives of decedents to exercise control over personal data
according to the decedent’s wishes.
This Note will focus on the posthumous disposition of the per-
sonal information businesses collect, use, and sell about individuals
and argue that data privacy rights should extend posthumously to
fulfill the promise of data privacy legislation like CCPA. In Part I,
this Note will examine the dead’s legal and customary rights, from
property rights to cultural observances, to identify the contours of
posthumous rights. Part II will shift the analysis to the evolution of
data privacy rights in American jurisprudence by tracing the de-
velopment of CCPA. Part III will weave together the contours of
posthumous rights with the development of data privacy rights to
argue that data privacy rights must extend posthumously.
I. THE RIGHTS WE OWE THE DEAD
The legal maxim that “the dead have no rights,” though pithy, has
never been strictly true.25 The field of trusts and estates exists to
ensure a decedent’s wishes for the distribution of an estate are
honored.26 The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act requires that the living
respect the wishes of the dead vis-à-vis organ donation.27 Criminal
22. See Alberto B. Lopez, Posthumous Privacy, Decedent Intent, and Post-mortem Access
to Digital Assets, 24 GEO. MASON L. REV. 183, 215-16 (2016).
23. See California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, ch. 55, § 2(e), 2018 Cal. Stat. 1807,
1809.
24. See id. § 2(i).
25. See Smolensky, supra note 7, at 763.
26. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, DEAD HANDS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF WILLS, TRUSTS,
AND INHERITANCE LAW 3-4 (2009).
27. At this time, forty-six states, the District of Columbia, and the U.S. Virgin Islands
have adopted the most recent amendments to the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act. Anatomical
Gift Act, UNIF. L. COMM’N, https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-home?Com
munityKey=015e18ad-4806-4dff-b011-8e1ebc0d1d0f [https://perma.cc/Q2AC-GMTF].
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statutes prevent the desecration of dead bodies and burial sites.28
Many of the legal rules that protect posthumous interests stem
primarily from “cultural norms, including dignity and respect for
decedents’ wishes.”29 A brief examination of three theories of post-
humous interests will lay the foundation for a consideration of
posthumous data privacy: property interests, dignitary interests,
and privacy interests.
A. Posthumous Property Interests
Within reasonable limits, American common law allows individu-
als to direct the distribution of real property and to condition its
uses following an individual’s death.30 So long as testamentary
wishes are lawful, a decedent’s decisions will generally be honored.31
A decedent’s beneficiaries may take legal action to enforce the
decedent’s wishes (even, in some cases, by taking legal action
against each other).32 Suits regarding real property are common
enough, while an emerging area of law considers the ownership of
digital assets, such as social media profiles and the contents of
email accounts.33 Though analyzing the legal theories of ownership
of digital assets remains beyond the scope of this Note, the underly-
ing theory that digital data constitutes property will figure into the
discussion to follow.
In addition to the real property a decedent leaves behind, the law
also treats the decedent’s remains as property.34 The property
28. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7052(a) (West 2018) (“Every person who
willfully mutilates, disinters, removes from the place of interment, or commits an act of sexual
penetration on, or has sexual contact with, any remains known to be human, without
authority of law, is guilty of a felony.”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:22-1 (West 2002) (specifying a
similar prohibition to California’s law); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4216 (McKinney 2010)
(prohibiting body stealing); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-600 (2010) (similar to California’s law).
29. Smolensky, supra note 7, at 764.
30. See Julia D. Mahoney, The Illusion of Perpetuity and the Preservation of Privately
Owned Lands, 44 NAT. RES. J. 573, 573-74 (2004). The rule against perpetuities generally
limits individuals from commanding the living beyond the grave. See id.
31. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 26, at 4.
32. See, e.g., Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 300 (2006).
33. See, e.g., Ajemian v. Yahoo!, Inc., 84 N.E.3d 766, 768 (Mass. 2017) (involving a
decedent’s brother and sister suing Yahoo! for access to their brother’s email account).
34. See, e.g., Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, 25 U.S.C. § 3002(a) 
(establishing that the “ownership” of Native American remains found on federal or tribal land
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interests in one’s remains are limited to the specification of funerary
arrangements (within reason), though as Dahlia Lithwick points
out, “[A] will’s burial specifications are not probated until long after
the funeral.”35 While respect for burial specifications, as a practical
matter, veers away from property interests and into the cultural
norms and dignitary interests discussed by Professor Smolensky,
the treatment of a decedent’s likeness is firmly rooted in notions of
property.36
Though there is no libel of the dead, some jurisdictions empower
a decedent’s beneficiaries to file libel suits on a theory that a third
party has violated the decedent’s publicity rights.37 This theory
centers on the notion of “descendible publicity rights” as a form of
perpetual right to identity, which becomes a form of property.38 This
theory is grounded more in protecting the living’s ability “to create
marketable identities and with protecting the financial interests of
the decedent’s heirs” rather than protecting the decedent’s digni-
tary interests.39 This claim would be actionable when a libel claim
would fail because the injury suffered is concrete: a loss of econom-
ic value.40 Generally, though, the law does not allow for posthumous
defamation under the belief that the dead no longer have a reputa-
tion and cannot suffer offense.41
Though not legally actionable, the cultural taboo against speaking
ill of the dead plays a central role in traditions of posthumous
dignitary interests. The next Section discusses how concerns for the
dignity of the dead have shaped these interests in both cultural
norms and state statutes.
shall be “in the lineal descendants of the Native American”).
35. Dahlia Lithwick, Habeas Corpses, SLATE (Mar. 14, 2002, 5:45 PM), https://slate.com/
news-and-politics/2002/03/what-are-the-rights-of-dead-people.html [https://perma.cc/9SFH-
KYKY]. Lithwick also details the strange case of a French couple who wished to be interred
in a refrigerated container in the basement of their chateau. See id. A French court ordered
their burial or cremation, over the objections of the couple’s son. See id.
36. See Smolensky, supra note 7, at 763-64.
37. See William H. Binder, Publicity Rights and Defamation of the Deceased: Resurrec-
tion or R.I.P.?, 12 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 297, 299 (2002).
38. See id. at 298.
39. Smolensky, supra note 7, at 769.
40. See Bo Zhao, Posthumous Defamation and Posthumous Privacy Cases in the Digital
Age, 3 SAVANNAH L. REV. 15, 19 (2016).
41. See, e.g., Rich v. Fox News Networks, LLC, 939 F.3d 112, 125 (2d Cir. 2019).
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B. Posthumous Dignitary Interests
American society honors the dead in ways that are deeply
embedded within the philosophical discussion over whether the
dead have rights.42 After all, “one measure of any civilized society is
how they treat their dead.”43 Whether the treatment of the dead is
mandated by statute and enshrined by “rights” or is simply custom-
ary, taboos against desecrating human remains and speaking ill of
the dead persist.44 As such, an individual need not specify burial
arrangements or express a desire to be free of postmortem humilia-
tion to enjoy these interests posthumously. However, statutes exist
to enforce posthumous dignitary interests.45
This raises the important question of whom these dignitary in-
terests actually benefit: the dead or their heirs? One may argue, as
many have, that just as the dead neither enjoy reputation nor per-
ceive harm postmortem, their dignitary interests extinguish with
their life.46 Others, however, have argued persuasively that the law
does not require the perception of harm to constitute a violation of
the law.47 A landowner, to take just one example, suffers trespass
whenever an individual enters her land without permission—
whether the landowner is aware of the trespass or not.48 Following
this line of argument, the dead suffer a trespass on their dignity
whenever it is violated, even if they can no longer be aware of it.
For those who do not find this argument persuasive, providing a
definitive answer to the question of whom dignitary laws protect
is less important for the following analysis than recognizing that
American cultural values respecting the dead have shown a will-
ingness to protect their dignity.
Numerous criminal statutes support this interpretation of a
trespass to the dead’s dignity, including those that prohibit the
42. See Smolensky, supra note 7, at 763-64.
43. Lithwick, supra note 35.
44. Consider, for example, Sophocles’s Greek tragedy Antigone, which centered on the
refusal to treat a fallen foe with customary respect. SOPHOCLES, ANTIGONE 3-9 (David
Franklin & John Harrison trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 2003) (c. 441 B.C.E.).
45. See, e.g., supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
46. See JENNIFER E. ROTHMAN, THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY: PRIVACY REIMAGINED FOR A
PUBLIC WORLD 156 (2018).
47. See Smolensky, supra note 7, at 764.
48. See id. at 771.
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desecration of human remains, sexual intercourse with a dead
body, and the theft of a dead body.49 To ensure proper care of the
bodies of the dead, many states regulate the funeral industry,
license funeral homes, and regularly inspect crematoriums.50 The
public outcry (and ensuing litigation) over the Tri-State Crematory
scandal—in which a crematory operator accepted payment for
cremations he never performed, returned fake remains to grieving
families, and stashed the remains of over three hundred decedents
across his family’s property—amply demonstrates the cultural
significance of the laws and regulations that protect the sanctity of
the bodies of the dead.51
In addition to protecting the sanctity of bodies after death, there
has long been a culturally recognized norm of restricting the use of
images of the dead.52 The Supreme Court has recognized that
“[f]amily members have a personal stake in honoring and mourning
their dead and objecting to unwarranted public exploitation that, by
intruding upon their own grief, tends to degrade the rites and
respect they seek to accord to the deceased person who was once
their own.”53 The sad case of Nikki Catsouras demonstrates how
these complicated dignitary issues became exacerbated by rapid
advances in technology.54 There, a teenager fatally crashed her car
in a gruesome accident.55 California Highway Patrol (CHP) officers
on the scene, following protocol, took pictures of the accident for
their report.56 Those CHP officers then forwarded those images to
others and the images went viral.57 Catsouras’s parents, who had
49. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
50. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 7653.2 (West 2016) (granting the state authority
to inspect crematories); N.H. CODE ADMIN. R. ANN. FRL. 603.01 (2019) (providing for
inspections of funeral homes that perform embalming); N.J.STAT.ANN. § 45:7-33 (West 2019)
(requiring embalmers and funeral directors to be licensed).
51. See Sara Rimer, Dazed by Crematory Scandal, Undertakers’ Trust Is Shaken, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 21, 2002), https://www.nytimes.com/2002/02/21/us/dazed-by-crematory-scandal-
undertakers-trust-is-shaken.html [https://perma.cc/M8GB-WLYZ].
52. See Nat’l Archives & Recs. Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 167-68, 170 (2004).
53. Id. at 168.
54. See Jessica Bennett, For Family of Nikki Catsouras, a Victory in Court, NEWSWEEK
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been prevented from identifying their daughter’s remains, were
bombarded with these images and filed suit against CHP58 and
the two CHP officers responsible for disseminating the images.59
Ultimately, a California appeals court, unpersuaded by the officers’
claim to have used the images to discourage drunk driving, cas-
tigated the officers’ “moral[ ] deficien[cy]” in creating a “vulgar spec-
tacle” that inflicted “devastating trauma”60 and paved the path for
an out-of-court settlement.61 As the litigation following Nikki Cat-
souras’s death revealed, a disregard for the dead’s dignity rights
can also violate their privacy rights.
C. Posthumous Privacy Rights
The right to privacy is a much more recently developed right, one
that has been the subject of some controversy since its articulation
in cases like Griswold v. Connecticut.62 As thorny as a right to pri-
vacy is for the living, it has an even more complex half-life as a
posthumous right. Many scholars argue that the dead have no right
to privacy,63 just as the dead cannot be defamed.64 However, the law
recognizes at least two instances of a posthumous interest in pri-
vacy: within the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act of 1996 (HIPAA)65 and the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).66
As the key law regulating health information and privacy,
HIPAA primarily focuses on a patient’s right to privacy with re-
spect to information regarding their personal health and medical
58. Id.
59. Jon Mills, On Web, Families of Victims Entitled to Privacy, U. FLA. NEWS (Mar. 2,
2010), https://news.ufl.edu/archive/2010/03/on-web-families-of-victims-entitled-to-privacy.html
[https://perma.cc/PC5G-LY9E].
60. Catsouras v. Dep’t Cal. Highway Patrol, 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d 352, 357-59 (Ct. App. 2010).
However, Nikki Catsouras had not been drinking and a toxicology screening found a blood
alcohol content of zero. R. Scott Moxley, EX-CHP Employee Loses Again on Leak of
Decapitation Pictures, OCWKLY. (May 26, 2011), https://www.ocweekly.com/ex-chp-employee-
loses-again-on-leak-of-decapitation-pictures-6460655/ [https://perma.cc/A6TE-W7YC].
61. Bennett, supra note 54.
62. See 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
63. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 6521 cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 1977).
64. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
65. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110
Stat. 1936 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) [hereinafter HIPAA].
66. 5 U.S.C. § 552.
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treatment.67 HIPAA is comprised of several overarching rules, in-
cluding the Privacy Rule and the Security Rule.68 HIPAA’s Privacy
Rule “governs the use and disclosure of protected health infor-
mation”—information that identifies or can be used to identify an
individual, an individual’s health condition (past, present, or
future), the healthcare an individual receives, as well as payment
information.69 In addition, HIPAA’s Security Rule mandates
“specific protections to safeguard” an individual’s information when
it is stored electronically.70 One of the most important provisions in
HIPAA creates an individual’s right to control who sees her health
information and how that information is used.71 Except in in-
stances where access to health information would affect an indi-
vidual’s care, the individual retains the power to control access and
use of their health information.72 While HIPAA limits an indi-
vidual’s absolute control over their health information, it does
provide another protection for an individual’s privacy: HIPAA
prohibits the release of an individual’s personal health information
for fifty years following the individual’s death.73 The Department of
Health and Human Services identifies the privacy interests of
surviving relatives and the decedent’s wishes as the main forces
driving this protection.74
HIPAA has generally been read both as creating a floor rather
than a ceiling in regulating personal health information and as
allowing states to create more restrictive privacy schemes.75 There
67. See Austin Rutherford, Comment, Byrne: Closing the Gap Between HIPAA and Patient
Privacy, 53 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 201, 204 (2016).
68. Your Rights Under HIPAA, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., https://www.hhs.gov/
hipaa/for-individuals/guidance-materials-for-consumers/index.html [https://perma.cc/XAD8-
DCEX].
69. Rutherford, supra note 67, at 204-05.
70. Privacy, Security, and Electronic Health Records, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.,
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/consumers/privacy-
security-electronic-records.pdf [https://perma.cc/C8UM-GNEV].




73. See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103(2)(iv) (2018) (defining “protected health information”).
74. See Health Information of Deceased Individuals, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.,
https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/ privacy/guidance/health-information-of-deceased-
individuals/index.html [https://perma.cc/KEK6-JP3W].
75. Rutherford, supra note 67, at 206.
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is a growing question of whether HIPAA creates a private right of
action, particularly as the theft of personal health information
through data breaches targeting healthcare companies appears to
be on the rise.76 In 2018, the Connecticut Supreme Court interpreted
HIPAA as creating a private right of action when an individual sued
a clinic for violating her HIPAA rights by disclosing her medical
information to a third party without her knowledge or consent.77
However, the consensus among the federal courts of appeal remains
that HIPAA neither creates nor implies a private right of action.78
The remaining remedies in HIPAA are fines against the violating
entity, which still vindicate a patient’s right to privacy.79 It remains
clear that Congress intended to protect posthumous privacy to
personal health information and incorporated that intention in
HIPAA’s statutory framework.80
While the posthumous privacy interests encompassed by FOIA
may be less easily intuited than in HIPAA, Congress and the courts
have recognized and respected this interest since FOIA went into
effect in 1967.81 The overarching objective of FOIA is to provide “the
public the right to request access to records from any federal
agency.”82 Its purpose is to give “a broad right of access to ‘official
information’”83 that enables the people to “know what their govern-
ment is up to.”84 That access, however, is not unlimited, and several
classes of exemptions preclude certain information from being
76. See Reed Abelson & Julie Creswell, Data Breach at Anthem May Forecast a Trend,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/07/business/data-breach-at-
anthem-may-lead-to-others.html [https://perma.cc/76SP-UNZM].
77. See Byrne v. Avery Ctr. for Obstetrics & Gynecology, P.C., 102 A.3d 32, 49 (Conn.
2014).
78. See, e.g., Mayfield v. Presbyterian Hosp. Admin., 772 F. App’x 680, 686 (10th Cir.
2019) (holding that HIPAA does not create a private right of action); Bradley v. Pfizer, Inc.,
440 F. App’x 805, 809-10 (11th Cir. 2011) (noting that there is no private right of action for
a violation of HIPAA’s confidentiality provisions); Miller v. Nichols, 586 F.3d 53, 59 (1st Cir.
2009) (holding that HIPAA does not create a private right of action).
79. See 45 C.F.R. § 160.402 (2018).
80. See generally HIPAA, supra note 65, § 264.
81. FOIA Legislative History, NAT’L SEC. ARCHIVE, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nsa/
foialeghistory/legistfoia.htm [https://perma.cc/2C8U-WNKR].
82. What Is the FOIA?, U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.foia.gov/faq.html [https://perma.cc/
662J-3B8E].
83. U.S. Dep’t of Just. v. Reps. Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 772 (1989)
(quoting EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 80 (1973)).
84. Id. at 773 (quoting Mink, 410 U.S. at 105).
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released, most notably “personnel and medical files and similar files
the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy”85 and “records or information compiled
for law enforcement purposes ... [that] could reasonably be expected
to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”86
Courts have repeatedly granted FOIA exemptions when parties
have requested death scene photographs, specifically citing Ex-
emption 7(C)—the exemption focused on law enforcement records.87
Because courts have been reluctant to read a right to privacy as
extending beyond the grave, the first challenge in these FOIA
requests is to identify whether there is a cognizable claim to
privacy.88 In National Archives and Records Administration v. Fav-
ish, regarding a FOIA request for death scene photographs of
Deputy White House Counsel Vince Foster’s suicide, the Court rec-
ognized that Foster’s family had a cognizable right to privacy and
extended Exemption 7(C) to the family.89 Though the Court did not
find that the family occupied the same position as the individual
subjected to potential disclosure, it concluded that Congress
“intended to permit family members to assert their own privacy
rights against public intrusions long deemed impermissible under
the common law and in our cultural traditions.”90 This connects a
legal posthumous privacy interest with the cultural posthumous
privacy interest discussed above, illustrating a shared sense of post-
humous dignity and respect running throughout different consid-
erations of the right to privacy.
85. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6).
86. Id. § 552(b)(7).
87. See Nat’l Archives & Recs. Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 170 (2004); see also
Campus Commc’ns, Inc. v. Earnhardt, 821 So. 2d 388, 392 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (provid-
ing background on a mediated settlement between the Earnhardt family and a newspaper
seeking to publish autopsy photographs following Dale Earnhardt’s fatal car crash in 2001).
88. As discussed in Part I.A, the dead cannot be defamed.
89. 541 U.S. at 160-61, 170.
90. Id. at 167.
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II. THE RIGHT TO DATA PRIVACY
Before the digital revolution, most personal information existed
solely in papers and documents.91 The potential for unauthorized
distribution of personal effects was rather limited,92 and the de-
cedent’s heirs generally exercised near total control.93 For exam-
ple, the postal service could not read a decedent’s mail or scan its
contents.94 In an increasingly digital and interconnected world,
however, an individual’s online footprint and digital trail can reveal
virtually limitless information about an individual’s physical and
mental health,95 biometric data,96 social network, daily routine, taste
in music and entertainment, and preferred news organizations.97
The challenge this kind of information presents is not just in its
sheer volume, but also in how seamlessly and quickly this data can
be tied to an individual, packaged, sold, and distributed.98
As the Supreme Court has noted in several Fourth Amendment
cases going all the way back to Katz, modern technology creates new
challenges to reasonable expectations of privacy.99 The pace of
91. See Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy and the Con-
stitution, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1172 (2002).
92. See Amitai Etzioni, A Cyber Age Privacy Doctrine: More Coherent, Less Subjective,
and Operational, 80 BROOK. L. REV. 1263, 1264 (2015) (noting that privacy violations in
the paper age resulted predominantly from primary collection of the papers and that any
secondary usage was limited).
93. See Lopez, supra note 22, at 192-93.
94. See id. at 218 (describing how email providers like Google and Yahoo scan their
customers’ emails for data to feed targeted marketing campaigns).
95. The health-related information collected by smart watches and fitness trackers now
includes physical activity, the location of that activity, heart rate, metabolism, sleep cycles,
blood sugar levels, and menstrual cycles. See Stacy-Ann Elvy, Commodifying Consumer Data
in the Era of the Internet of Things, 59 B.C. L. REV. 423, 426-27 (2018).
96. Biometric data includes facial scans and voice and finger prints. See id. at 427, 436.
97. See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 393-97 (2014) (discussing the various kinds of
data and personal information an individual’s cell phone may reveal).
98. See Kari Paul, Fitness and Health Apps May Be Sharing the Most Personal Details
About Your Life, MARKETWATCH (Mar. 5, 2019, 7:47 AM), https://www.marketwatch.com/
story/fitness-and-health-apps-may-be-sharing-the-most-private-details-about-your-life-2019-
02-26 [https://perma.cc/46P3-9KNB].
99. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967) (establishing that Fourth Amendment
protections “do not vanish when the search in question is transferred from the setting of a
home, an office, or a hotel room to that of a telephone booth. Wherever a man may be, he is
entitled to know that he will remain free from unreasonable searches and seizures”). Though
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digital innovation continues to accelerate, while the law struggles
to keep pace.100 Consider, as one example, that there are no federal
laws regulating the use of facial recognition software in law
enforcement.101 Ethicists have argued that, without regulation,
facial recognition software could be linked to state and federal law
enforcement databases, creating the following scenario: a police
officer wearing a body camera and walking through a crowd of
people would be able to instantaneously identify individuals with
outstanding arrest warrants, those with expired visas, and even
those with an expired driver’s license.102 Such a scenario chillingly
evokes George Orwell’s vision of a dystopian future society where
Big Brother is always watching.103
Compounding these concerns of a sinister panopticon are two
recent reports. First, the Federal Trade Commission recently found
that there are literally billions of data elements collected and
attached to nearly every American.104 In November 2019, reporting
revealed that Google’s parent company (Alphabet) partnered with
a nonprofit hospital organization on a data project intended to
a consideration of data privacy and personal information in the context of Fourth Amendment
protections is beyond the horizon of this Note, there is considerable scholarship developing
in the wake of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206
(2018). See, e.g., Ryan G. Bishop, Note, The Walls Have Ears ... and Eyes ... and Noses: Home
Smart Devices and the Fourth Amendment, 61 ARIZ. L. REV. 667, 671 (2019) (arguing that
smart home devices “have the potential to provide a pervasive and panoptic view of a person’s
daily life ... [and] implicate[ ] serious privacy concerns”); Daniel de Zayas, Comment,
Carpenter v. United States and the Emerging Expectation of Privacy in Data Compre-
hensiveness Applied to Browsing History, 68 AM.U.L.REV. 2209, 2211 (2019) (explaining how
tracking cookies collect significant data about individuals without their knowledge).
100. See Tarry Singh, AI Economy Will Further Accelerate the Pace of Innovation, FORBES
(Mar. 4, 2019, 10:28 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/cognitiveworld/2019/03/04/ai-economy-
will-further-accelerate-the-pace-of-innovation/ [https://perma.cc/Z8UM-4GTZ].
101. See Sidsel Overgaard, A Soccer Team in Denmark Is Using Facial Recognition to Stop
Unruly Fans, NPR (Oct. 21, 2019, 5:39 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/10/21/770280447/a-
soccer-team-in-denmark-is-using-facial-recognition-to-stop-unruly-fans [https://perma.cc/
5Q35-TCAJ].
102. See Jon Schuppe, How Facial Recognition Became a Routine Policing Tool in Amer-
ica, NBCNEWS (May 11, 2019, 1:19 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/how-facial-
recognition-became-routine-policing-tool-america-n1004251 [https://perma.cc/HPU8-S4TX].
103. See generally GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (1949).
104. FED. TRADE COMM’N, DATA BROKERS: A CALL FOR TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABIL-
ITY, at iv (2014).
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enhance medical artificial intelligence.105 With “Project Nightin-
gale,” Google now has access to tens of millions of patients’ medical
records through its partnership with healthcare provider Ascen-
sion—without the patients’ consent.106 Concerns about how Google
will use this data and whether it is in compliance with applicable
federal laws fall into an uneasy orbit around the search giant, which
has already amassed data sets as wide and diverse as our email cor-
respondence (Gmail), search history, shopping behavior, and bio-
metric data (through its recent acquisition of Fitbit).107
Against this backdrop of the growing range of data sources, the
integration of disparate sources, and the unknown potential of how
they will be used, this Note now turns to consider the strongest legal
frameworks to protect against the abuse of one’s data and privacy.
A. The First Data Privacy Framework: GDPR
The first comprehensive legislation to address data privacy
emerged from the European Union in 2016 and came into effect in
May 2018: the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).108
GDPR’s overarching intent is to provide consumers with greater
control over their personal data.109 GDPR originates from an under-
standing of the “right to the protection of personal data” as one of an
individual’s “fundamental rights and freedoms.”110 GDPR gives in-
dividuals the right to discover what information a company keeps
about them, how that information was collected, and how the
information is being used.111 It also empowers individuals to choose
to be forgotten by corporations, effectively requiring data-collecting
105. See Sidney Fussell, Google’s Totally Creepy, Totally Legal Health-Data Harvesting,
THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 14, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2019/11/goo
gle-project-nightingale-all-your-health-data/601999/ [https://perma.cc/8EYG-WVCR]. Google
and Ascension both assert that the deal complies with HIPAA, but the Department of Health
and Human Services has stated it wants to know more. See id.
106. Id. (“Neither affected patients nor Ascension doctors were made aware of the project.”)
107. See id.
108. See Arjun Kharpal, Everything You Need to Know About a New EU Data Law that
Could Shake Up Big US Tech, CNBC (May 25, 2018, 5:27 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/
2018/03/30/gdpr-everything-you-need-to-know.html [https://perma.cc/PV49-KFDU].
109. Id.
110. 2016 O.J. (L 119) 32.
111. See id. at 43.
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companies to delete the individual’s information and to stop
collecting the individual’s information in the future.112 Individuals
can also halt third parties from using and selling their informa-
tion.113
A key part of GDPR is consent.114 Companies must clearly explain
what they seek consumers’ consent to, specifically what data they
will collect from individuals.115 Companies must also make it easy
for consumers to revoke their consent at any time.116 Under GDPR,
only individuals older than sixteen may give consent.117 Parents
may give consent for their children under sixteen, but GDPR
prohibits any data collection on children under thirteen.118 By
restricting the collection of data from and about children, GDPR
addresses a major concern among privacy advocates.119
While GDPR regulates the actions of companies that operate
within the EU and the European Collective Economic Bloc, it also
protects the data privacy rights of all individuals living within the
EU.120 This requires U.S. companies to adhere to GDPR when inter-
acting with individuals living in the EU.121 However, it can be dif-
ficult to know with certainty when a consumer falls within GDPR
protection. Because fines for noncompliance range up to 4 percent
of the offending company’s total global revenue, many companies
with international consumer bases (or potential EU-based consum-
ers) began adhering to GDPR when it went into effect.122
Ultimately, American consumers under this regime experienced
the worst of both worlds. They were treated to annoying footers
asking for consent to sites’ cookie policies while receiving none of
the protections granted to their EU-based brethren. However, the
112. See id. at 43-44.
113. See id. at 45.
114. See id. at 37.
115. Id. at 8.
116. Id. at 37.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. For a discussion of minors’ overarching right to privacy, see Helen L. Gilbert,
Comment, Minors’ Constitutional Right to Informational Privacy, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1375
(2007).
120. 2016 O.J. (L 119) 33.
121. See id.
122. Kharpal, supra note 108.
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introduction of new legislation coming out of California could
change all that.123
B. The American Solution: California Consumer Privacy Act
California has had a long tradition of blazing a path forward for
the nation in watershed regulatory events. California has been the
vanguard on key issues like climate change, when, “frustrated with
inaction at the federal level ... [i]n 2002, California passed Assem-
bly Bill 1493,” which set the nation’s first limits for greenhouse gas
emissions produced by automobiles.124 With an economy that rep-
resents 14 percent of the national economy, California often sets the
bar for compliance in various industries through its enactment of
key legislation; companies that do business in California likely do
business nationwide.125 The costs of maintaining multiple regulatory
schemes often prove too high to manage, leaving corporations to
adopt the most rigorous existing standards.126
Taking up the mantle of the nation’s trailblazer, California began
to seriously consider data privacy rights with the EU’s consideration
of GDPR.127 As home to Silicon Valley and its myriad digital giants,
California was uniquely positioned to address data privacy and to
signal to the major industry players that they must begin to pro-
tect it.128 Citing the increase in “the role of technology and data in
the every daily [sic] lives of consumers,”129 the “devastating effects”
to consumers caused by unauthorized data disclosures and the
123. At the time of writing, no major news stories have been published on implementation
and rollout of such legislation.
124. Jody Freeman, The Obama Administration’s National Auto Policy: Lessons from the
“Car Deal,” 35 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 343, 349 (2011).
125. See Matthew A. Winkler, The California Economy Isn’t Just a U.S. Powerhouse,
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 24, 2019, 4:28 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-
04-24/california-economy-soars-above-u-k-france-and-italy [https://perma.cc/6NRK-SZJT].
California’s economy is the fifth largest in the world, behind the U.S., China, Japan, and
Germany. See id.
126. See supra Part II.A (discussing an analogous scenario in which GDPR sets a higher
regulatory bar for foreign companies doing business in Europe).
127. Sarah Hospelhorn, California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) vs. GDPR, VARONIS
(Mar. 29, 2020), https://www.varonis.com/blog/ccpa-vs-gdpr/ [https://perma.cc/QD6H-W3CN]
(“The CCPA is an outcome of the GDPR’s reaching influence.”).
128. See Winkler, supra note 125.
129. California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, ch. 55, § 2(d), 2018 Cal. Stat. 1807, 1808-09.
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“loss of privacy,”130 and Cambridge Analytica’s illicit use of tens of
millions of consumers’ data,131 California created CCPA to ensure
the following rights:
(1) The right of Californians to know what personal information
is being collected about them.
(2) The right of Californians to know whether their personal
information is sold or disclosed and to whom.
(3) The right of Californians to say no to the sale of personal
information.
(4) The right of Californians to access their personal informa-
tion.
(5) The right of Californians to equal service and price, even if
they exercise their privacy rights.132
In addition, CCPA provides extensive definitions of personal in-
formation,133 which businesses are subject to regulation,134 and what
“selling” personal information means.135 While CCPA can be broadly
understood as a reaction to the misuse of consumers’ digital per-
sonal information, the Act makes clear that CCPA encompasses
all data that businesses collect about consumers, including their
off-line behavior.136
While CCPA is primarily concerned with consumer privacy as
a right in itself, it also implicitly acknowledges that control over
one’s personal information includes the ability to prevent corpora-
tions from monetizing one’s personal information to create a
profit.137 The extensive definitions of business and commercial pur-
poses, transfers, sales, and disclosures reveal CCPA’s twin pro-
tections: the right to privacy and the right to remain an individual
130. Id. § 2(f).
131. Id. § 2(g).
132. Id. § 2(i).
133. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(o) (West 2020).
134. See id. § 1798.140(c).
135. Id. § 1798.140(f), (t).
136. Id. § 1798.175.
137. See id. § 1798.120(a).
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and not a product.138 CCPA protects businesses’ ability to use
personal data for improving products and services and debugging
software.139 However, it clearly empowers consumers to stop
businesses from selling their personal information.140 This is likely
to have a significant impact on companies like Facebook, whose
recent court filings show that the social media giant increased its
revenue per user sevenfold after giving third-party developers
access to consumers’ personal information in exchange for a cut of
the developers’ revenue.141 Where Facebook must comply with
GDPR (and, thus, can be prevented from selling consumer data), its
revenue per user is significantly less.142
Two important, related provisions of CCPA factor into the fol-
lowing analysis. First, CCPA allows an individual to exercise pri-
vacy rights on behalf of another individual, provided the latter has
so authorized the former.143 This is a broad right and extends be-
yond parents and guardians acting on behalf of their minor children,
because CCPA addresses the sale of the personal information of
minors separately.144 One can imagine this provision being used by
the guardians of vulnerable individuals or by the adult children of
impaired parents. Part of the provision’s intent appears to be
making the right easy to use and understand. Underscoring this in-
tent are other requirements for businesses, such as the posting of
a link on a business’s homepage to a web page where consumers
may consent to, or opt out of, information collection.145
A second key provision of CCPA differentiates it from HIPAA
and FOIA.146 CCPA creates a private right of action for consum-
ers to file civil suit when their data has been disclosed without
their authorization or when businesses violate their personal
138. See id. § 1798.140(d), (f), (t).
139. See id. § 1798.105(d)(2)-(3).
140. Id. § 1798.120(a).
141. See Elena Botella, Facebook Earns $132.80 from Your Data per Year, SLATE (Nov.
15, 2019, 3:25 PM), https://slate.com/technology/2019/11/facebook-six4three-pikinis-lawsuit-
emails-data.html [https://perma.cc/ZPR4-S6BD].
142. Id. In Europe, Facebook’s average revenue per user is $41.91, compared with $132.80
in the United States. Id.
143. See CIV. § 1798.135(c).
144. See id. § 1798.120(d).
145. Id. § 1798.135(a)(1).
146. See supra Part I.C (discussing HIPAA and FOIA).
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information collection preferences.147 HIPAA, as discussed above,
has been widely interpreted as barring private rights of action.148
Under CCPA, this private right of action allows courts to award
money damages (on a per-incident basis), declaratory and injunctive
relief, or “[a]ny other relief the court deems proper.”149
There is, however, one set of Californians that CCPA does not
explicitly protect: the dead. Weaving together CCPA’s private right
of action and its provision allowing individuals to exercise privacy
rights on behalf of others, this Note will explore how CCPA has
created a clear direction on how to consider and protect posthumous
data privacy rights.
III. THE DATA PRIVACY RIGHTS OF THE DEAD
Before embarking on an analysis of potential posthumous privacy
frameworks, one might be forgiven for asking why the dead need
data privacy. After all, the principles underlying the denial of
posthumous defamation surely apply to posthumous privacy—the
dead cannot be embarrassed.150 The dead must be beyond caring
whether someone discovers that they Googled personally embarrass-
ing information.151 The dead cannot be served extremely specific
targeted ads online.152 The dead are no longer affected by data
breaches that release their personally identifiable information to
the dark web.153 Why devote any time or effort to such a purely
academic exercise?
147. See CIV. § 1798.150(a).
148. See supra notes 75-80 and accompanying text.
149. CIV. § 1798.150(a)(1)(c).
150. Melissa Gaied, Note, Data After Death: An Examination into Heirs’ Access to a
Decedent’s Private Online Account, 49 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 281, 296 (2016).
151. For the living, however, the plethora of articles rounding up embarrassing Google
searches by states illustrate that the concern is real. See, e.g., Joe Berkowitz, Infographic:
Here Are the Most Embarrassing Popular Google Searches in Each State, FAST CO. (Aug. 27,
2015), https://www.fastcompany.com/3050425/infographic-here-are-the-most-embarrassing-
popular-google-searches-in-each-state [https://perma.cc/MUP5-CG7D].
152. See Zittrain, supra note 14.
153. See, e.g., David Yaffe-Bellany, Here’s What You Need to Know About the Capital One
Breach, N.Y. TIMES (July 30, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/30/business/capital-
one-breach.html [https://perma.cc/XFP9-DVAU].
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Yet, as discussed above, there are instances in which American
society does consider the dead’s wishes and interests—even when
such interests matter only to the living.154 Laws require respect for
a decedent’s dignitary interests and prohibit desecration and other
mistreatment of human remains—even though a decedent could
never know.155 Whether these laws actually aim to protect a
decedent’s heirs from emotional distress or to protect the decedent’s
dignitary interests, the outcome remains the same. Although the
dead can never know whether they receive a burial in accordance
with their wishes, American laws and culture dictate respect for a
decedent’s wishes, no matter whether those wishes are expressed in
a will or by another manner.156
Similarly, these wishes can include expression of a wish for
posthumous privacy, as in the case of the public figure who seals her
papers for fifty years following her death.157 In such a case, if a
decedent expressed a desire for data privacy—particularly if this
decedent were a Californian and fell under the protection of CCPA—
the combination of customary respect for dying wishes and CCPA’s
protections would make a case for posthumous data privacy. CCPA
even appears to accommodate this with its provision allowing a duly
authorized individual to assert the privacy rights of another.158
Whether CCPA would require a will or other documentation of this
wish for posthumous data privacy is unclear, though the spirit of the
legislation seems to favor a liberal construction of privacy rights.159
154. See supra Parts I.A, I.B.
155. See supra Parts I.A, I.B. The many ghost stories in American culture that start with
a violation or desecration of a decedent’s burial site, of which Stephen King’s Pet Sematary
is a notable example, speak to the strong cultural taboo against disregarding the dead’s
wishes. See STEPHEN KING, PET SEMATARY (1983).
156. See supra Parts I.A, I.B; see also Lithwick, supra note 35.
157. For example, T.S. Eliot’s letters to an old flame were recently unsealed, fifty years
after the deaths of both parties. Violet Kim, T.S. Eliot Left a Deliciously Petty Note to Future
Readers of His Private Letters, SLATE (Jan. 2, 2020, 8:36 PM), https://slate.com/culture/
2020/01/t-s-eliot-letters-emily-hale-princeton.html [https://perma.cc/4CQT-SEWX].
158. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.135(c) (West 2020); see also supra notes 143-45 and ac-
companying text.
159. See CIV. § 1798.194 (“This title shall be liberally construed to effectuate its purposes.”).
For those decedents who did not express a desire for data privacy in life, the path forward is
unclear. One might argue persuasively that these decedents should not enjoy rights in death
that they did not proactively seek in life.
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Given the recent emergence of data privacy as a concept, it follows
that few have considered or articulated final wishes for the dispo-
sition of their data privacy. In the United States, with an average
life expectancy of seventy-six years for men and eighty-one years for
women160 and rates of digital adoption that show an inverse rela-
tionship between age and internet usage,161 this topic unsurprisingly
has not been extensively explored in end-of-life planning. After all,
if those who are statistically closest to death are generally unfamil-
iar with how their data is collected and used (an assumption made
given their low rates of internet usage), it is plausible that those
individuals may not express strong opinions on the use of their
personal information after death. The individuals who are more
likely to be aware of how their personal information is collected and
used, following this line of reasoning, are more likely to be younger
and, potentially, more likely to die intestate.162 Therefore, the
combination of data privacy protections heralded by CCPA and the
strong likelihood that individuals will increasingly want to exercise
these protections makes it very likely that discussions of post-
humous data privacy will become part of end-of-life planning. The
fight has already begun on another front, in which the untimely
deaths of more digitally savvy individuals have resulted in legal
battles with the digital giants over their heirs’ ability to access
digitally stored personal information, such as email accounts or
social media profiles.163
One might reasonably ask, because GDPR so strongly influenced
CCPA,164 whether GDPR can provide guidance where CCPA has
been silent. However, GDPR is also silent on whether privacy
protections apply posthumously; in fact, “the GDPR does not pro-
vide any protection for data of deceased data subjects,” and this si-
lence “has triggered an interesting debate” among scholars in the
160. Actuarial Life Table, SOC. SEC. ADMIN. (2016), https://www.ssa.gov/oact/STATS/table
4c6.html [https://perma.cc/UMJ4-HA8V].
161. See Internet Use by Age, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Jan. 11, 2017), https://www.pewresearch.
org/internet/chart/internet-use-by-age/ [https://perma.cc/5BRP-HPC9] (showing that 100 per-
cent of eighteen- to twenty-nine-year-old individuals and only 73 percent of individuals sixty-
five and older are online).
162. See Natasha Chu, Protecting Privacy After Death, 13 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP.
255, 259-60 (2015).
163. See id. at 262-63; see also Ajemian v. Yahoo!, Inc., 84 N.E.3d 766, 768-70 (Mass. 2017).
164. See Hospelhorn, supra note 127.
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international community.165 GDPR allows EU member states to
create their own legislative solutions for posthumous data privacy
protections, resulting in at least four unique approaches from
Estonia, Italy, France, and Catalonia.166 Some of these frameworks
conceive of personal information as a kind of “quasi-property,” while
another framework analogizes posthumous data privacy protection
to a healthcare-advanced directive.167
While not following the various EU approaches precisely, this
Note will now return to the three posthumous rights frameworks
discussed in Part I, identify the key points of each approach, and
weave these together to produce a proposal to create posthumous
data privacy.
A. A Dignitary Approach
The dignitary rights framework stems from deeply held cultural
beliefs in the importance of honoring and respecting the dead. One
could argue the innate logic that requires laws to protect the bodies
of the dead from insult and injury should also apply to the revealing
search histories (and other personal information) of the departed.168
Shielding the dead from indignity is an important aspect of respect-
ing a decedent’s wishes and protecting the heirs from unnecessary
pain and suffering, as discussed above in the sad afterlife of images
from Nikki Catsouras’s car crash.169 Dignitary laws act on behalf of
both the decedent and the decedent’s heirs.170
Arguably, however, an individual’s search history—however em-
barrassing it may be—is unlikely to spring into a second life in a
way that would attract public attention, particularly if the dece-
dent is not otherwise known to the public. Though American socie-
ty bridges ever-greater connections via memes and viral moments,
165. Gianclaudio Malgieri, R.I.P.: Rest in Privacy or Rest in (Quasi-)Property? Personal
Data Protection of Deceased Data Subjects Between Theoretical Scenarios and National
Solutions, in DATA PROTECTION AND PRIVACY: THE INTERNET OF BODIES 1, 2 n.1 (Ronald
Leenes et al. eds., 2018).
166. Id. at 2, 12.
167. See id. at 2-3, 12-18.
168. See supra Part I.B.
169. See supra notes 54-61 and accompanying text.
170. See Lithwick, supra note 35.
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the likelihood of any individual’s personal information breaking
through the growing digital noise is increasingly slight.171 Indeed,
some evidence suggests that American culture may be becoming
more sensitive to the plight of those made viral against their wishes
and more willing to protect the vulnerable from cyberbullying.172
However, online communities have become increasingly adept at
using social media and other platforms to publicly call out racism,
homophobia, and other biases.173 The criteria defining sympathetic
victims are evermore blurry and shifting; ultimately, a decedent and
their heirs cannot rely on cultural protections to ensure posthumous
privacy.
However, one customary dignitary protection remains available
for privacy: the sealing of one’s personal papers.174 While this most
often occurs in the estates of individuals whose contributions to a
society’s cultural or academic life merit special consideration,175
anyone can request that protection in a will or to an heir. The ability
to seal records is the linchpin of the next privacy approach this Note
will consider: HIPAA.
B. A HIPAA- and FOIA-Influenced Approach
For posthumous privacy, HIPAA’s provisions constitute the
clearest legal protections for an individual’s personal information.
Per 45 C.F.R. § 160.103, an individual’s protected health infor-
mation is protected for fifty years after death.176 This protected
171. For a deeper dive into memes and how their growing use triggers interesting copyright
and property rights questions, see Lauren Levinson, Comment, Adapting Fair Use to Reflect
Social Media Norms: A Joint Proposal, 64 UCLA L. REV. 1038 (2017).
172. See, e.g., Mendel Forta, Note, Cyberbullying: Are You Protected? An Analysis and
Guide to Effective and Constitutional Cyberbullying Protections, 37 CARDOZO ARTS&ENT.L.J.
165, 185-87 (2019).
173. See, e.g., Antonia Noori Farzan, BBQ Becky, Permit Patty and Cornerstore Caroline:
Too ‘Cutesy’ for Those White Women Calling Police on Black People?, WASH. POST (Oct. 19,
2018, 6:08 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2018/10/19/bbq-
becky-permit-patty-and-cornerstore-caroline-too-cutesy-for-those-white-women-calling-cops-
on-blacks/ [https://perma.cc/SG6G-XPN7] (discussing the use of hashtags like #BBQBecky
and videos to draw attention to the phenomenon of white women calling the police over the
innocuous and entirely lawful activity of African Americans).
174. See Hodson, supra note 17, at 194-97; see also Kim, supra note 157.
175. See Hodson, supra note 17, at 202, 206.
176. See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103(2)(iv) (2018) (protected health information definition).
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health information includes “demographic information collected
from an individual,”177 as well as personal information that
(2) [r]elates to the past, present, or future physical or mental
health or condition of an individual; the provision of health care
to an individual; or the past, present, or future payment for the
provision of health care to an individual; and
(i) [t]hat identifies the individual; or
(ii) [w]ith respect to which there is a reasonable basis to
believe the information can be used to identify the individ-
ual.178
This regulation appears to be the strongest protection for an indi-
vidual’s posthumous privacy in federal law.179 Numerous concerns
justify the protection of health information, including an innate
respect for individual privacy and autonomy and a desire to protect
individuals from discrimination based on an individual’s health
information.180 In terms of posthumous privacy, however, only an
innate respect for an individual’s privacy explains the extension of
protection to fifty years after the individual’s death, when autonomy
and discrimination are no longer viable concerns. Congress’s
perception of a need for posthumous privacy and motivation to
create statutory protections for it highlight the importance of this
interest.
One might argue, because HIPAA creates no private right of
action for individuals or their heirs in the event of an unauthorized
disclosure, HIPAA cannot be interpreted to support posthumous
privacy. After all, there is no right without a remedy.181 Yet, a
textualist approach to statutory interpretation will underscore that
including the fifty-year postmortem provision clearly expresses
177. Id. § 160.103 (individually identifiable health information definition).
178. Id. § 160.103(2)(i)-(ii) (individually identifiable health information definition).
179. This conclusion is based on a thorough (but not exhaustive) search of federal
legislation.
180. For a discussion of “healthism,” which is discrimination based on an individual’s
health condition(s), see Jennifer Bennett Shinall, Intersectional Complications of Healthism,
18 MARQ. BENEFITS & SOC. WELFARE L. REV. 255 (2017).
181. L’ou le ley done chose, la ceo done remedie a vener a ceo, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
(11th ed. 2019) (“Where the law gives a right, it gives a remedy to recover.”).
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Congress’s intent.182 At the time of HIPAA’s passage in 1996,
hospitals and healthcare facilities were the primary creators and
keepers of protected health information—Fitbit, 23andMe, and
Apple would not come along for more than a decade to disrupt
healthcare as powerful new players in personal health infor-
mation.183 The possibility of widescale data breaches and the
unauthorized disclosure of protected health information posed a
lower threat when HIPAA became law.184 In light of this history, the
limitations of hewing too closely to a traditional textualist interpre-
tation come into sharp focus.
CCPA’s own language closely parallels these definitions in
HIPAA. HIPAA defines individually identifiable health informa-
tion as information “[w]ith respect to which there is a reasonable
basis to believe the information can be used to identify the individ-
ual.”185 CCPA defines personal information, in part, as “information
that identifies, relates to, describes, is reasonably capable of being
associated with, or could reasonably be linked, directly or indirectly,
with a particular consumer or household.”186 CCPA regulates the
collection of IP addresses, devices, and data that would create a
probabilistic basis for identification.187
CCPA addresses the concern that highly sophisticated actors can
use seemingly innocuous data to create a profile to track an
182. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Three Symmetries Between Textualist and Purposivist
Theories of Statutory Interpretation—and the Irreducible Roles of Values and Judgment
Within Both, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 685, 687 (2014) (describing traditional textualism as being
rooted in the notion “that the implications of statutory language are often unmistakable to
any competent speaker of English, with no need for specialized knowledge about legal history
or traditions”).
183. Fitbit was founded in 2007. Who We Are, FITBIT, https://www.fitbit.com/us/about-us
[https://perma.cc/U96E-2HGK]. 23andMe was founded in 2006. About Us, 23ANDME, https://
mediacenter.23andme.com/company/about-us/ [https://perma.cc/6QXP-QPVG]. And Apple
debuted its Apple Watch in 2014. Apple Unveils Apple Watch—Apple’s Most Personal Device
Ever, APPLE (Sept. 9, 2014), https://www.apple.com/newsroom/2014/09/09Apple-Unveils-
Apple-Watch-Apples-Most-Personal-Device-Ever/ [https://perma.cc/4JF8-DLL4].
184. See, e.g., Lily Hay Newman, The WIRED Guide to Data Breaches, WIRED (Dec. 7, 2018,
9:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/wired-guide-to-data-breaches/ [https://perma.cc/659F-
CGSU]. Although data breaches occurred prior to the digital revolution, their ubiquity and
impact became greater with the advent of the internet. See id.
185. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103(2)(ii) (2018) (individually identifiable health information def-
inition).
186. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(o)(1) (West 2020).
187. See id. § 1798.140(x).
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individual across the internet, essentially creating a homing beacon
that traces their movements from the moment they go online.188
Similarly, apprehension of the unknown uses of personal infor-
mation appears to drive the posthumous protection of health
information. Though the utility of knowing that an elderly relative
had her gallbladder removed seems just as unclear as the value of
the departed’s search history, such provisions in CCPA safeguard
highly sensitive personal information from being used in unantici-
pated ways that are irreconcilable with a decedent’s wishes and
beliefs.
One must also note that HIPAA’s posthumous protection has a
shelf life of fifty years.189 Such data is not destroyed, but merely
taken out of reach for the time period when its relevance is
highest.190 Applying a similar hold and an expiration date to data
privacy would harmonize with HIPAA’s underlying concerns and
would be consistent with the strongest current statutory protections
of posthumous privacy. This approach would be an intentional
departure from the time windows specified for data privacy in
CCPA, which require individuals to renew their request for privacy
every twelve months.191
Given the interest in finality when settling a decedent’s estate,
adopting a set privacy window feels more fitting in the posthumous
context than requiring that the heirs repeatedly take action. There
are very limited (and perhaps no) examples of estate administration
that would require cyclical, repetitive actions to accomplish a single,
overarching goal. The concerns attendant in administering an estate
also inhere in the property-rights framework this Note turns to
next.
C. A Property- and Publicity-Rights-Influenced Approach
While courts continue to consider whether intentionally created
digital assets constitute property, neither courts nor legislatures
have clearly determined whether the information created by an
188. See supra notes 129-39 and accompanying text.
189. See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103(2)(iv) (2020) (protected health information).
190. See Health Information of Deceased Individuals, supra note 74.
191. See CIV. § 1798.135(a)(5).
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individual’s online activities is property.192 While CCPA addresses
this kind of personal information, it does so from a privacy-rights
framework.193
Analogizing this kind of personal information to property is not
intuitive in part because, unlike intellectual property (another form
of intangible property),194 an individual creates this information
unintentionally and unknowingly.195 However, this intangible, unin-
tentionally created data represents significant value to corporations
(and governments) that can aggregate and mine the data.196 This
information begins to look like a kind of property due to its potential
value and unclear ownership.
Establishing control over a potentially valuable and intangible
form of property fits within the realm of publicity rights. In life, an
individual exercises control over intangible assets like their image,
likeness, and the uses of it.197 In some states, an individual’s family
may continue to exercise publicity rights on behalf of the dece-
dent.198 For example, the estate of Elvis Presley has made a cottage
industry of asserting vigorous control over the use of the King’s
likeness.199 Typically, publicity rights have been limited to celebri-
ties; however, there is no bright-line test to determine whether
publicity rights are a viable cause of action for a decedent’s heirs.200
The appeal of the publicity-rights approach is that it can accommo-
date information unknowingly collected from an individual (say, a
photograph), while also addressing the monetary value of such uses.
192. See Lopez, supra note 22, at 215.
193. See California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, ch. 55, § 2(a)-(b), 2018 Cal. Stat. 1807,
1808.
194. The law recognizes many forms of intangible property. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF PROP.: WILLS AND DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 6.2(h) (AM. L. INST. 2003); RESTATEMENT (FIRST)
OF PROP. ch. 13, topic 2 (AM. L. INST. 1936).
195. However, the law acknowledges the existence of property in cases in which an indi-
vidual dies intestate (that is, without expressing intent or even an awareness of the property
in her estate) and provides for the estate’s succession to the nearest heir. See Intestate,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). CCPA also includes information that businesses
attach to individuals to trace them—unique identifiers such as “cookies, beacons, pixel tags,
[and] mobile ad identifiers.” CIV. § 1798.140(x).
196. See de Zayas, supra note 99, at 2211-12.
197. See Binder, supra note 37, at 299.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 297-98 n.4.
200. Id. at 299.
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Yet, the theory of publicity rights on its own does not fully fit the
contours of posthumous data privacy. On average, the amount of
revenue an individual’s personal information would create for a
single corporation or industry does not approach what pirating the
King’s likeness represents for the Presley estate.201 The scale of an
individual’s posthumous data privacy is significantly smaller than
Elvis’s estate, but taken in the aggregate, posthumous data privacy
is massive. Indeed, about 90 percent of American adults use the in-
ternet,202 and approximately 2.8 million Americans died in 2017.203
In addition, while publicity rights typically apply only to the fa-
mous,204 posthumous privacy must necessarily apply to all.
A better model to capture the individual economic value and the
potential scope of data collection derives from the legacy of
Henrietta Lacks.205 In 1951, Henrietta Lacks, an African American
woman living in Baltimore, was treated at Johns Hopkins for an
aggressive form of cervical cancer that ultimately took her life.206
During her diagnosis and treatment, researchers at the hospital
took tissue from Lacks without her consent and made an amazing
discovery—her cancer cells were immortal.207 If fed with proper
nutrition and kept in ideal conditions, these cells would reproduce
infinitely.208 The discovery of the first line of “immortal human
cells”209 transformed medicine, revolutionizing fields like virology210
and human genetics.211 Lacks’s cells, known as HeLa cells,212 were
used to develop the polio vaccine213 and in vitro fertilization, among
201. According to Forbes, the estate of Elvis Presley earned $35 million in 2017. Zack
O’Malley Greenberg, Elvis Presley’s Earnings: $35 Million in 2017, FORBES (Oct. 30, 2017,
12:51 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/zackomalleygreenburg/2017/10/30/elvis-presleys-
earnings-35-million-in-2017 [https://perma.cc/P9TH-6G6C].
202. Internet/Broadband Fact Sheet, PEW RSCH. CTR. (June 12, 2019), https://www.pew
research.org/internet/fact-sheet/internet-broadband/ [https://perma.cc/FQT8-HUWD].
203. See Kenneth D. Kochanek, Sherry L. Murphy, Jiaquan Xu & Elizabeth Arias, Deaths:
Final Data for 2017, 68 NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP. 1, 1 (2019).
204. See Binder, supra note 37, at 299.
205. See generally REBECCA SKLOOT, THE IMMORTAL LIFE OF HENRIETTA LACKS (2010).
206. See id. at 13, 86, 209.
207. See id. at 33, 41.
208. See id. at 41.
209. See id. at 1.
210. Id. at 98.
211. Id. at 100.
212. See id. at 1.
213. See id. at 93-97.
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other breakthroughs.214 Henrietta Lacks’s cells created a new
industry that sells human biological materials and generates sig-
nificant revenue each year.215 Yet, all this occurred without
Henrietta Lacks’s consent and without the knowledge of her heirs.216
When published, the story of Henrietta Lacks caused an outcry and
sparked a debate over the legal rights of individuals and their
survivors.217
Lacks’s story introduces an ethical dimension to this analysis
that traces a new contour in the data privacy model. The unethical
harvesting of HeLa cells was the first link in a long chain of events,
each of which created corporate wealth and was tainted by that first
ethical breach.218 Similarly, when corporations harvest individuals’
data without their knowledge or meaningful consent, it can feel like
a (smaller-scale) ethical violation. The monetization of that data
further exacerbates the ethical violation. In an apt parallel, Lacks’s
historian noted that today any one individual’s cells are unlikely to
spark the kind of medical revolution and corporate financial wind-
fall HeLa cells did, just as any one individual’s data is unlikely to
create the next Silicon Valley billion-dollar start-up—instead, the
value of an individual’s cells comes from being part of a larger
connection.219 Similarly, the aggregation of individuals’ data is how
Facebook makes a killing.220
CCPA recognizes the potential for unethical corporate behavior
and provides a resolution that puts California residents in control
of their personal information.221 Yet, the potential for unethical uses
of personal information actually increases after an individual’s
death under the current law because corporations face no restric-
tions in the data of the dead. Recognizing and protecting the right
to posthumous data privacy would close this key gap in the current
legislation.
214. Id. at 2.
215. See id. at 194.
216. See id. at 6, 33.
217. See generally Gail Javitt, Why Not Take All of Me? Reflections on The Immortal Life
of Henrietta Lacks and the Status of Participants in Research Using Human Specimens, 11
MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 713 (2010) (presenting the central concerns in this bioethics debate).
218. See SKLOOT, supra note 205, at 194.
219. Id. at 322.
220. See Botella, supra note 141.
221. See supra notes 129-39 and accompanying text.
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D. The Proposed Approach
This Note argues that a right to posthumous data privacy is the
logical extension of several legal frameworks that already protect
the rights of the dead, though no single framework fully traces the
contours of this right. It is necessary, then, to weave together the
protections from each framework to create a stronger and fully
realizable posthumous data privacy right. First, creating a right to
posthumous data privacy accords with the cultural respect for
posthumous dignity discussed above.222 Second, current statutes
already provide two key aspects to posthumous data privacy pro-
tection, for instance, in HIPAA: the automatic sealing of personal
health information and the fifty-year horizon under which the
personal information remains under seal.223 This is critical because
HIPAA does not require that the decedent make an express wish for
the privacy of their health information. Third, property and
publicity rights provide an economic rationale for the need to protect
posthumous data privacy.224 Simply put, corporate revenue models
are based on the use of individual data, even if an individual’s data
becomes valuable only when aggregated with that of other similar
individuals.225 There is also the underlying ethical requirement,
articulated in CCPA, that individuals must have control over the
use of their personal information.226 The importance of that ethical
requirement extends beyond death, as the case of Henrietta Lacks
so elegantly illustrates.227
Some may question the extent to which posthumous protection
should reach and whether all types of data should be protected
equally. While some types of data may more directly implicate
traditional privacy interests, there are at least two arguments
against a tiered approach to posthumous data privacy. First, given
the clear analogy between posthumous data privacy and HIPAA,
HIPAA’s approach should govern.228 HIPAA does not create tiers
222. See supra Part I.A.
223. See supra notes 67-74 and accompanying text.
224. See supra Part III.C.
225. See Botella, supra note 141.
226. See supra notes 137-40 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 205-17 and accompanying text.
228. See supra Part III.B.
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of posthumous health data protection, therefore neither should
posthumous data privacy.229 The second argument against tiering
posthumous data privacy is the ease of implementation and enforce-
ment. Neither GDPR nor CCPA tiers protection for data privacy.
Introducing tiers of protection for posthumous data would compli-
cate the regulatory schemes, make integration ungainly, and sow
confusion within the affected industries.
California is uniquely positioned to break new ground in creating
a posthumous data privacy right.230 As the above analysis has ar-
gued, the legal and ideological foundation supporting data privacy
rights also supports posthumous data privacy.231 Change must come
in the form of an amendment to CCPA that creates a right to
posthumous data privacy and establishes a fifty-year seal on the
release and use of data belonging to deceased Californians. The
state’s political landscape should facilitate the smooth integration
of posthumous rights to data privacy. The political factors weighing
in favor of the amendment’s introduction and passage include
CCPA’s broad public approval,232 CCPA’s unanimous passage in
2018,233 the Democratic Party’s supermajority in both chambers of
the California State Legislature,234 a Democratic governor (Gavin
Newsom),235 and a Democratic attorney general (Xavier Becerra).236
Since only state legislators may introduce bills in the legislature,
Attorney General Becerra’s office should work with the original bill’s
sponsors (Assemblyman Ed Chau and Senator Robert Hertzberg) to
craft the amendment.237 In the meantime, as the amendment makes
229. See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103(1)-(2) (2018) (protected health information definition).
230. See supra notes 124-26 and accompanying text.
231. See supra Part III.A-C.
232. See Kagan, supra note 6.
233. Issie Lapowsky, California Unanimously Passes Historic Privacy Bill, WIRED (June
28, 2018, 5:57 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/california-unanimously-passes-historic-
privacy-bill/ [https://perma.cc/M2NJ-Q5J8].
234. Patrick McGreevy, Democrats Win Back a Supermajority in California’s Legislature,
L.A. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2018, 9:15 PM), https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-ca-democrats-
supermajority-california-legislature-20181112-story.html [https://perma.cc/43W6-PAQ6].
235. See id.
236. See Cyrus Farivar & David Ingram, California Is Bringing Law and Order to Big
Data. It Could Change the Internet in the U.S., NBC NEWS (May 13, 2019, 11:47 AM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/california-bringing-law-order-big-data-it-could-
change-internet-n1005061 [https://perma.cc/6F9R-HBJW].
237. See Lapowsky, supra note 233.
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its way through both legislative chambers, Attorney General
Becerra should announce his support of posthumous data privacy
and work with industry trade groups and industry leaders (like
Facebook and Google) to prepare for compliance. A multi-industry
advisory board that includes companies with HIPAA experience
would also help the tech industry prepare for the amendment’s
passage. Passing an amendment and partnering with industry
leaders would set the bar for future data privacy legislation com-
ing out of other states, as well as for a federal raft of statutory
protections.
CONCLUSION
The need to establish a right to data privacy is a product of the
digital age, but the need to extend that right to the dead stems from
a much older legal tradition, reaching back to the ancient Greeks
moved by the tragedy of Antigone.238 The right to dignity and respect
after death exists just as much now in the modern United States as
three thousand years ago in ancient Greece. Enshrining posthumous
data privacy as a right honors the cultural heritage of American
society’s deeply held beliefs and takes into account the modern
innovations of the technological age.
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